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States often attempt to regulate political speech in the form of
deliberate lies related to ballot initiatives, referenda, candidates, or their
political positions. Some courts focus on the various harms of electoral
lies, while others focus more on the risks of bias and partisan abuse
involved in such speech regulations; the cases are in disarray.
This Article argues, however, that the most important problem
underlying this case confusion is inherent in the widely utilized
constitutional standard of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny typically
requires a compelling governmental interest, "narrow tailoring," and
some causal relation between the regulation and the compelling
interest. The crucial point, though, is that, as this Article documents,
each of these elements lends itself to a surprising degree of
arbitrariness, judicial subjectivity, uncontrollable complexity, and sheer
impracticality. The Article works through these problems, both in the
context of electoral lies and much more broadly, and considers two
significant possible reforms of standard versions of the judicial strict
scrutiny test.
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INTRODUCTION
Neither electoral campaigns nor lies are recent innovations.' One
might suppose that our judicial system would, by now, have established
how best to address the problems of lies and electoral campaigns.
Curiously, though, this is not the case.2 Courts have yet to create a
broadly applicable and well-justified approach to lying electoral speech
and related problems. And this problem leads directly into much
broader and more general problems with judicial strict scrutiny.
This Article illustrates the lack of consensus with regard to a judicial
approach to electoral lying, devoting only brief attention to narrowly
specific, loosely related problems such as the political libel cases and
the actual malice standard. First, this Article discusses the Supreme
Court's controversial project of allowing speech categories and
classifications, by themselves and without any further judicial analysis,
to largely dictate judicial case outcomes. Second, given the prominence
of strict scrutiny tests, which require at least a compelling public
interest and a narrowly tailored regulation,3 this Article then discusses
whether strict scrutiny tests are of much genuine help in the lying
electoral speech cases and elsewhere.
As it turns out, the familiar strict scrutiny tests, here and throughout
constitutional law, do not uniquely promote legally constrained,
evidence-based, reasonably objective, or well-informed judicial
analysis. Instead, strict scrutiny tests only incompletely, arbitrarily, and
defectively structure judicial analyses, or merely reflect judicial
intuitions. Whether we can reasonably ask the courts for more than such
incomplete analyses and intuitions is unclear. Modified versions of a
strict scrutiny test are possible; but once we see the courts as
unavoidably relying on more or less well-informed judicial intuitions,
we will no longer be surprised by any lack of judicial consensus in any
legal area involving reliance on a strict scrutiny test.
1. See Simon de Montfort, 6th Earl of Leicester, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Simon de Montfort, 6th Earl of Leicester (last
visited Feb. 17, 2012) (discussing a prototype of an electoral campaign, which apparently
required its representatives to be elected at the county or borough level); see also JOHN MILTON,
PARADISE LOST bk. 5, at 119 (John Leonard ed., Penguin Books 2000) (1667) ("His
count'nance, as the morning star that guides / The starry flock, allured them, and with lies /
Drew after him the third part of Heav'ns host.").
2. See infra Part I.
3. See, e.g., infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. As Part III explores, regulations
often fail under strict scrutiny not for lack of a compelling government interest or narrow
tailoring, but because the court finds the cause-and-effect linkage between the regulation and
sufficient promotion of some designated government interest to not have been shown with
sufficient empirical rigor. The wisdom of assuming that everything important can be empirically
proven is doubtful.
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Let us now concretely introduce some of the basic issues through a
look at a recent, controversial, and important electoral speech case, 281
Care Committee v. Arneson,4 along with some related cases, in order to
fill in the legal landscape and set the stage for some broader conclusions
about the stark limitations of judicial strict scrutiny.
I. THE PROBLEM OF LYING ELECTORAL SPEECH
Arneson involved a free speech challenge to a portion of the
Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act.5 The Minnesota statutory
provision at issue declares:
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who
intentionally participates in the preparation, dissemination,
or broadcast of paid political advertising or campaign
material.., with respect to the effect of a ballot question,
that is designed or tends to ... promote or defeat a ballot
question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or
communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether
it is false. 6
The provision thus focuses on ballot questions rather than on electoral
candidates and campaigns (though our interest herein will be on both).7
Further, the provision in Arneson requires merely reckless disregard of
falsity or actual malice,8 as opposed to actual knowledge of falsity.9 For
some purposes below, it will be more useful for us to assume the
defendant's actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement in
question-that the defendant-speaker engaged in deliberate lying.' 0
4. 638 F.3d 621,621 (8th Cir. 2011).
5. Id. at 625.
6. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 221B.06 (2008)).
7. Id.
8. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (illustrating the classic
statement of the actual malice standard in the political defamation context); see also St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("[Reckless disregard] is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.").
9. See MINN. STAT. § 221B.06.
10. For our purposes, we can treat knowingly and intentionally false claims of fact as
synonymous with lies, even if there are some contexts in which not all such claims would be
unequivocally considered lies, as well. Consider the case of the hapless spokesperson for a
dictator who is required to formally deny what is evident and clear to any observer. The
spokesperson declares what he knows to be false, but may have no expectation, and no desire, of
persuading any listener. Whether that intentionally false statement should also count as a lie is at
least debatable. One might also argue that communicating a known falsehood to someone who
does not deserve that truth-as in the case of a would-be murderer seeking information-should
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In Arneson, the district court determined that the type of speech at
issue-to oversimplify, we will assume knowingly false factual claims
about a ballot measure-was categorically outside the scope of First
Amendment protection." In this, the district court followed, if it did not
expand upon, the general logic of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.12 The
underlying rationale in Chaplinsky was that "the right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances."' 3 Chaplinsky
crucially concluded:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and the obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any
proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a
criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument." 14
Of course, cases after Chaplinsky have brought some, if not all, of the
supposedly exempted categories of speech within the scope of the First
Amendment.' 5 But the underlying idea that certain kinds of literal
speech fall outside of, or are unprotected by, the Free Speech Clause
in some sense not count as a lie. For useful general discussions of the precise meaning and status
of lying, see, for example, SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
(2d ed. 1999); THOMAS L. CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2010);
MARTIN JAY, THE VIRTUES OF MENDACITY: ON LYING IN POLITICS (2010); THE PHILOSOPHY OF
DECEPTION (Clancy Martin ed., 2009); James Edwin Mahon, The Definition of Lying and
Deception, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 21, 2008), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/lying-definition/. For a valuable historical
perspective, see PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, LYING: AN AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF DUPLICITY (2004).
For numerous further relevant citations, see R. George Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech,
2011 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
11. See Arneson, 638 F.3d at 633.
12. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
13. Id. at 571.
14. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-
10(1940)).
15. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (discussing obscenity); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing libel of public officials).
[Vol. 64
ELECTORAL LIESAND THE BROADER PROBLEMS OFSTRICTSCRUTINY
retains a certain appeal. 16
We can imagine someone saying that deliberate lies in the electoral
context are not an "essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality." 17 If a deliberate lie can be a step to the truth, it is at best
an indirect step. More typically, we would think of a deliberate lie as a
step away from the truth.
The court in Arneson, however, concluded that even if defamation
were unprotected or only modestly protected speech, then
nondefamatory electoral lies might well deserve greater free speech
protection. 19 Speech defaming a political figure is not only false, but
also is presumably injurious to the victim's reputation or other private
interests. 20 But as the court observed, "A ballot initiative clearly cannot
be the victim of a character assassination. ' 21
Nor did the appellate court in Arneson feel at liberty to take up, on
its own independent merits, the question of whether the category of
deliberate electoral lies should fall outside the scope of the Free Speech
22Clause. Here, the court felt bound by the Supreme Court's argument in
the recent animal cruelty video case of United States v. Stevens. 23 The
court understandably took Stevens to broadly prohibit courts from
conducting a category-based assessment of whether a certain kind of
speech, independent of viewpoint, is appropriate for free speech
protection in light of its free speech value and other costs and benefits.24
This prohibition would presumably include judicially considering the
16. Consider, for example, forged endorsements, ransom notes, bank stick-up instructions,
etc. For the distinction between the logical scope and the range of protection of the Free Speech
Clause, see Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REv. 687,
697 (1997).
17. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
18. We might distinguish a lie from an allegory, a parable, or a metaphor intended to
convey a truth, as in the case of PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, ch. X, Ill, at 106 n.1 (Francis
MacDonald Cornford ed. & trans., 1941, Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1990) (c. 360 B.C.E.).
19. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 634-35 (8th Cir. 2011).
20. See id. at 634.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 635.
23. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). For further discussion, see the majority opinion of Justice
Antonin Scalia, and the opinion of Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurring in the judgment, in
the rental of violent video games to minors case of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
24. Arneson, 638 F.3d at 635 (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585). As our discussion
below suggests, reasonably assessing the free speech and other costs and benefits of some
questionably defined category of speech is likely to be more complex than is often appreciated.
Of course, some serious risks of any legal regime's regulation of its opponents' electoral speech
will seem obvious enough. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (1977).
FLORIDA LA WREVIEW
category of deliberate electoral lies.
Crucially, the Stevens Court had proclaimed any such "free-
floating' 25 categorical balancing test to be "startling and dangerous."26
Instead, it looked to some combination of the constitutional text,27
longstanding historical traditions of speech regulations,28 a distinction
between merely descriptive and genuinely prescriptive Supreme Court
language,29 and special exceptions, 30  rather than to a "highly
manipulable balancing test." 31 The Stevens Court's desire to discourage
vague balancing tests in determining the scope of free speech protection
is certainly understandable. But the Stevens Court's own multifaceted
approach, adopted in Arneson,32 is no less problematic, for a variety of
reasons.
First, the constitutional text does not tell us what kinds of speech,
literal or otherwise, count as speech for free speech purposes. The
Constitution does not even define "speech" in the first place. The First
Amendment does not itself decide for us that computer code translatable
into instrumental music or purely commercial nude dancing count as
speech, but that social dancing, public nude sunbathing, forged
documents, and kidnapping ransom notes from a political group do
not.33 We must make such decisions based on some sort of reasoning
about why we wish to specially protect certain speech.34 To pretend that
the Constitution defines "speech" or otherwise states how to make these
classifications is, at best, to beg the question.
Second, looking to longstanding historical traditions, and
particularly to case law, to decide what counts as protection-worthy
speech invites the questions raised by any case law precedent: Are
persons entitled to rely on precedent in perpetuity? And what justified
the original judicial decision? An "original" judicial decision, by
definition, cannot rely on longstanding precedent. Is it not possible that
our communications technology or our broader culture may have
changed over time in ways that make the original judicial decision
classification less defensible? 35 More broadly, why could our culture




29. See id. at 1585-86.
30. See id. at 1586.
31. Id.
32. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011).
33. See R. George Wright, What Counts as "Speech" in the First Place?: Determining the
Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 1217 (2010) (suggesting a multifactored
approach to defining the scope of protected speech).
34. See id.
35. Is it possible, for example, that the cultural respectability of pure racial epithet speech
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and technology not change in ways that occasionally result in a new
form of activity that contributes little as speech but imposes serious
costs to free speech and other important constitutional values?
Third, the Stevens Court's attempt to classify the underlying logic of
the Chaplinsky case 36 as merely descriptive, rather than prescriptive or
action-guiding,37 is less than convincing. Chaplinsky asserts that certain
kinds of utterances are not an "essential part of any exposition of
ideas,, 38 and therefore, given their presumed nature and effects, are not
worth special constitutional protections. 39 Admittedly, accepting this
idea does not guarantee the motive to prescriptively apply it, even as
one factor among others, in any given case. 4u But if a court were to
accept Chaplinsky's descriptive logic, such a court would have at least a
prima facie, rebuttable, but action-guiding reason actually to apply
(rather than to ignore) the rationale of Chaplinsky. It is frankly difficult
to envision the Supreme Court dismissing the underlying rationales of
its own opinions as merely descriptive, and not also prescriptive, on a
consistent basis.
Fourth, while the Stevens Court argued that some cases may have
considered the minimal communicative value of the particular category
of speech in question,41 along with the public interest in prohibiting
such speech,42 the Court argued that such decisions also relied on a clear
connection between the prohibited speech and some underlying
nonspeech activity that is itself criminal.43 In this narrow class of
exceptions, though, should underlying activity that is not criminal, but is
tortious or consistently costly to defenseless victims, not also count
when deciding whether to protect the kind of speech in question?
has changed over the past two centuries? See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
36. See supra text accompanying note 18.
37. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
38. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
39. See id. at 571-72.
40. As philosopher David Hume famously stated, "Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger." DAVID HuME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE bk. 2, pt. 3, sec. 3, at 267 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford
Univ. Press ed. 2007) (1740). Hume's claim is controversial, but the Stevens Court's distinction
between the merely descriptive and the prescriptive in Chaplinsky seems both dubious and
unlikely to be applied consistently. If we "describe" a person as displaying cowardice, it will not
be easy to avoid inferring that we should not imitate the person in that respect.
41. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
42. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
43. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (citing the non-computer-generated child pornography
case of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982)). The Stevens Court in also referred
to formulations like the Chaplinsky rationale, when applied as a judicial test, as "highly
manipulable." Id. at 1586.
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It should also be noted that the Stevens Court referred to
Chaplinsky's rationale, 44 when applied as a judicial test, as a "highly
manipulable balancing test.'A5 Where Chaplinsky would actually rank
on a manipulability scale, compared to other well-established and
typically unquestioned Supreme Court tests, is subject to debate.46 As
emphasized below, 47 the familiar strict scrutiny test used in several
constitutional contexts is subject to a remarkable degree of judicial
manipulation.
Based on the arguments of Stevens, then, there is actually little
reason not to apply the basic logic of Chaplinsky to Arneson. Stevens
gives courts little reason not to ask of any fairly described kind of
speech whether that speech in general is likely to begin to repay the
costs it imposes, in terms of free speech and other values. This seems,
for all anything Stevens says to the contrary, a fair, sensible, practical,
and relevant question to ask of the category of deliberate electoral lies,
as suggested by Arneson.
Of course, there may be better reasons than those offered in Stevens
not to apply Chaplinsky's basic logic to deliberate electoral lying. After
all, deliberate electoral lies still fall within the category of"quintessential political speech,' '48 which is at the very heart of free
speech protection. 49 And even then, there should be no guarantee in
advance as to whether deliberate lying electoral speech would pass any
Chaplinsky-style categorical exclusion test. 50
There is no reason in principle why a Chaplinsky-type speech
categorical balancing test could not take into proper account any
44. See supra emphasized text accompanying note 14.
45. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
46. For one example among numerous possible contenders, see Justice Scalia's opinion of
the Lemon test in McCreary County, 545 U.S 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting): "As bad as
the Lemon test is, it is worse for fact that, since its inception, its seemingly simple mandates
have been manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve."
47. See infra Parts II, III.
48. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011).
49. The special status of pure political speech is recognized in cases such as Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966), and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964),
as well as in the more recent cases of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 898 (2010), and the military funeral protest case of Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
1215 (2011). There are, of course, a range of other relevant considerations, including
decisionmaker bias, debatable or borderline cases, speech-chilling effects, and the possible need
to protect some lies in order to give breathing space to the truth. See Arneson, 638 F.3d at 636;
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74 (invoking the need for breathing space in the public official defamation
"actual malice" test context); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.").
50. For merely one complication among others, some deliberate political, if not electoral,
lies may contribute directly or indirectly to civilized values. See Wright, supra note 10. On the
other hand, electoral lies may do more harm to electoral politics, authority, legitimacy,
governance, and political speech itself than other forms of deliberate lying.
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constitutionally relevant consideration, including, if appropriate, some
or all of what is normally considered under a strict scrutiny test. In fact,
several cases do apply the basic Chaplinsky test to some forms of
deliberate political lies and find such lies as a category to be unworthy
of special free speech protection.51  53
But if we nonetheless choose to follow Stevens52 and Arneson, we
naturally wind up applying some form of the familiar strict scrutiny
test 54 to content-based 5 restrictions on deliberate electoral lies. We are
thus left with a familiar strict scrutiny test for regulation of even
deliberate electoral lies, under which the government must establish a
genuinely compelling public interest 56 promoted by the regulation,5 7 as
well as sufficient causation, and narrow tailoring, or only minimal
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the scope of the speech
regulation.
The strict scrutiny test, in general and in the context of electoral
lying, is ironically rarely subject to broad critical scrutiny.5 9 While this
Article cannot undertake a truly comprehensive examination of judicial
strict scrutiny across all contexts, it does suggest many important
general problems in the applied logic of strict scrutiny in the electoral-
lying context and elsewhere.
51. See, e.g., Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573, 577 (6th Cir. 1991)
("False ... political speech[] does not merit constitutional protection if the speaker knows of the
falsehood or recklessly disregards the truth." (citing Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75)); Ohio
Democratic Party v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 07AP-876, 2008 WL 3878364, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2008).
52. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
53. See Arneson, 638 F.3d at 636.
54. See id.; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
55. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of
Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333 (2006).
56. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898-99 (2010)
(suggesting that any departure from strict scrutiny for content-based regulation of political
speech might be in the direction of an even more rigorous test, perhaps including an absolutist
categorical protection for political speech, and distinguishing a number of cases in which the
content-based regulation of political speech was deemed necessary for some agency of
government, including public schools, to perform its assigned task).
57. See id.; Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982) ("When a State seeks to restrict
directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First Amendment surely requires that
the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a
compelling one, and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected
expression."); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992); State v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 697, 699
(Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding a state statute prohibiting malicious sponsoring of false
statements of material political fact to be facially unconstitutional).
58. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
59. See Arneson, 638 F.3d at 636; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
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II. SCRUTINIZING STRICT SCRUTINY
Under the most familiar strict scrutiny formula, a government
seeking to regulate deliberate electoral lying on the basis of its content
would have to show the necessary causal connection, and that such
regulation "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.",6 This is generally regarded as a
demanding test, though not so demanding as to be "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact." 61
As we might imagine, though, each component of such a strict
scrutiny test, as well as the overall test itself, is open to some degree of
subjectivity and to conscious or subconscious manipulation. In the
absence of a perfectly drafted regulation, some degree of regulatory
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness, and thus some imperfection in
tailoring, is inevitable. 62 There are no objective, readily recognized, and
readily applicable criteria for determining when merely imperfect
tailoring becomes constitutionally insufficiently narrow tailoring.
What should count as a genuinely compelling (rather than a merely
substantial) governmental interest 64 is similarly murky. Interests do not
come labeled as compelling or less-than-compelling. A strong, widely
shared, emotional interest could be illegitimate. To find an interest to be
either genuinely compelling or slightly less than compelling typically
requires broad reflection and the exercise of sound moral and practical
judgment in several distinct respects.
In the cases of alleged lying in electoral contexts, several possible
regulatory interests might be invoked. A legislature might seek, for
example, to protect potential targets from the emotional, distracting,
defamatory,6 - and other effects of deliberate electoral lies. Or a
legislature might choose to regulate such speech in an attempt to
promote, to one degree or another, "the integrity of elections. 6  It is
important to recognize that these formulations all refer to at least
somewhat different interests. These interests could diverge. They are
not all basically alternative ways of referring to the same governmental
60. Rickert v. State, 168 P.3d 826, 828 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Burson, 504 U.S.
at 198) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). For a stringent electoral speech
interpretation, see 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 696-97.
62. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts
Legitimize What They Do, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 167, 183-87 (1997).
63. See id. at 183-87, 195-98.
64. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential
but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988).
65. See Rickert, 168 P.3d at 829-30.
66. Id. at 830.
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interest.
In any event, at least some of these interests have been held to be
less than compelling, at least considered separately and in isolation from
the others.67 One might certainly expand the range of possible interests.
A legislature could be concerned that electoral lies might deter highly
capable potential candidates from running in the first place. Legitimacy
and authority could be at stake, albeit in ways difficult to prove. Or a
legislature might seek to promote, again to some unspecifiable degree,
not so much the integrity of elections, but the civility of electoral
discourse or political campaigning.68
A legislature might also seek to regulate electoral lies on a theory
that involves both paradox and common sense. We might call this the
public interest in the value of free speech. Let us consider an analogy to
the flow of speech in the flow of water. Again, all problems of
effectiveness, implementation, and abuse set momentarily aside, we
have some interest in both the volume of a water flow and in the purity
or toxicity of the water flow. The best combination of volume and
purity of water flow will depend upon purpose and context. If we seek
to extinguish a house fire, volume of flow will be high priority. Some
degree of contamination of that flow of water will typically be
acceptable. A reasonable legislature could seek to adjust downward the
degree of "contamination" in the form of deliberate electoral lies, even
at the cost of some reduction in the overall volume or flow of electoral
speech. If the flow of information becomes too contaminated, our
"filtering" costs as citizens and potential voters may rise, or we may
even stop drinking from the contaminated flow of electoral speech
entirely.
Some might characterize any concern for the contamination of flow,
in the narrow sense of deliberate electoral lies, as a matter of "an
informed electorate."6 9 But a broad concern for an informed electorate
might also take the form (with less burden on speech) of, say, a
reformed public school curriculum.7 0 This is the beginning of a narrow
tailoring problem. And the real aspiration might not be to a genuinely
informed electorate, but to an electorate that is simply not deliberately
misinformed in easily avoidable ways. As an electorate comes to fear
deliberate electoral lies, its otherwise unnecessary "filtering" of speech
67. See id. at 829-31.
68. For some relevant considerations, see generally R. George Wright, Self-Censorship
and the Constriction of Thought and Discussion Under Modern Communications Technologies,
25 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 123 (2011).
69. State v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 697 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
70. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Law of Education: Educational Rights and the Roles
of Virtues, Perfectionism, and Cultural Progress, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 385, 390 (2011)
(advocating the legal reform of public education to promote basic personal and civic virtue,
developmental perfectionism, and cultural progress over time).
2012)
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may increase-if the electorate does not simply become more apathetic,
cynical, jaded, and distrustful of and alienated from the electoral
process in general. But apart from cases of actual defamation, 71 an
interest in fostering "an informed electorate" has been held
insufficiently compelling to justify state regulation of false electoral
speech. 2
This is not to suggest that courts agree on all of the interests and
combinations of interests that fall short of "compelling" in the electoral
lying context. Courts' differences on what counts as compelling do not
really seem to hinge on subtleties of phrasing or the level of generality
of the interest's formulation. Instead, the differences in judicial
outcomes regarding what is compelling seem more substantive. For
example, an Ohio court declared, "It is a very compelling state interest
to promote honesty in the election of public officers." 73 More
elaborately phrased: "There is indeed a compelling state interest in
preventing the publication of false statements concerning candidates for
election to office where such statements are purposely published with
full knowledge of the falsity thereof and are designed to promote the
election or defeat of a candidate for office." 74
The cases, in general, typically do not clarify how one would know
whether a state interest, pursued with one speculative degree of success
or another, at some unpredictable overall cost or another, should count
as compelling. Common sense suggests that whether an interest is
compelling or perhaps overridingly important reflects not only the
interest itself, but also the costs of pursuing that interest. Most, if not all,
compelling interests are compelling in context, given some assumed set
of costs. "Compellingness," then, is really a matter of comparison with
alternatives.
The costs of pursuing any government interest take the form, in part,
of being unable thereby more fully to pursue other valued government
interests.75 This suggests that no government interest is ever compelling
in itself. Whether a government interest is compelling or, if we like,
overridingly important cannot be separated from some implicit
assessment of or sheer guess at the degree to which the goals of the
regulation in question are likely to actually be promoted when
compared to some alternative policy. 76 Nor can we responsibly say that
71. See 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 697.
72. Id.
73. DeWine v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 399 N.E.2d 99, 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
74. Id. This language was later adopted in the Ohio case of State v. Davis, 499 N.E.2d
1255, 1258 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (quoting DeWine, 399 N.E.2d at 103).
75. This is simply a matter of "opportunity costs." See, e.g., Opportunity Costs,
Economics A-Z Terms Beginning with 0, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/economics-a-
to-z/o (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
76. See id.
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an interest is overriding until we consider its various likely costs, as best
as we can reasonably, but quite fallibly, foresee them.77 Biases in
guessing costs are often built-in. And these costs must include whatever
value, or disvalue, of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness is
deemed likely to follow from applying the regulation over some period
of time.
We thus cannot generally say that an interest is compelling in the
abstract. "Compellingness" is relative. Whether consciously or not,
judges may intuitively (albeit speculatively) take the likely costs and
benefits of underinclusive and overinclusive regulations into account
when deciding whether the cited government interest counts as
compelling. Judges may not undertake this inquiry with much rigor. The
costs and benefits of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness are
partly a matter of constitutional law and partly a matter of the judge's
values. Even then, the questions of whether a government interest is
compelling and whether a regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored are
really not separate and distinct.
The degree of regulatory tailoring thus should be factored in, to one
degree or another, when determining whether the underlying interest is
genuinely compelling. Put simply, the very idea of an interest being
compelling is itself already contextual, deeply comparative, and
intricately interconnected. No interest is realistically compelling on its
own or apart from alternatives and the various costs of its pursuit.
Sometimes the real inseparability of the "compellingness" question,
and the degree of tailoring, among other costs of implementation, is
judicially obscured. Courts sometimes say that what appears to be a
desirable and important government interest is actually illegitimate or
somehow ruled out as an interest. Consider, for example, the language
of the Rickert v. State case.78 The Rickert majority concludes, even with
regard to knowingly false electoral statements, that "there simply cannot
be any legitimate, let alone compelling, interest in permitting
government censors to vet and penalize political speech about issues or
individual candidates." 79 Note that the court here does not concede the
possibility of some compelling government interest in this context, but
nevertheless goes on to address matters of narrow tailoring, abuse, and
practical implementation.
We sense the "relationality" of any supposedly compelling
government interests when we consider the earlier 119 Vote No! case. "
The majority in this case declared, more specifically than the later
77. See id.
78. 169 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
79. Id. at 830.
80. See State v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 698-99 (Wash. 1998) (en bane).
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Rickert majority,8 ' that "the State's claimed compelling interest to
shield the public from falsehoods during a political campaign is
patronizing and paternalistic."82 The majority concluded, "At its worst
the statute is pure censorship, allowing government to undertake
prosecution of citizens who, in their view, have abused the right of
political debate." 83
However much sympathy we may have for this underlying judicial
view, there seems to be here an odd and implausible literal claim that
there cannot be any legitimate, let alone compelling, interest in an
electoral campaign with fewer deliberate lies.84 But a far more
persuasive analysis would then bring in considerations of abuse, likely
cost, and narrow tailoring. Overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness
are matters of narrow tailoring or the lack thereof.85 The foreseeable
abuse of a regulation may also go to narrow tailoring. And the abuse of
a speech regulation, such that some deliberate lies are tolerated, while
some truths or merely careless or debatable errors are deterred,
expensively litigated, or actually punished, is more naturally a matter of
the degree of tailoring. The compelling or even legitimate nature of an
interest cannot be separated from issues of implementation,
enforcement, possible and actual consequences, likely abuse, and the
degree of the regulation's tailoring.86
Sometimes, the inseparability of the government interests at stake
and the degree of tailoring take on a further dimension of complexity.
We often do things for many distinct reasons. More than one
governmental interest can underlie regulation of deliberate electoral
lies, 87 just as more than one interest can underlie, say, affirmative action
in higher education. 8 8 Even if no single interest by itself rises to the
level of the genuinely compelling, a number of the relevant interests,
taken jointly and even cumulatively, might.89 But how is a court to
assess the presence or absence of narrow tailoring in such a
multipurpose "cumulative" case?90
81. See Rickert, 169 P.3d at 830.
82. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 698 (citing Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1989)).
83. Id. at 699.
84. See id.
85. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
86. See 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 698-99.
87. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
88. See R. George Wright, Cumulative Case Legal Arguments and the Justification of
Academic Affirmative Action, 23 PACE. L. REv. 1, 12-35 (2002).
89. See id. at 4-12. For broader background, see also J.C. Thomas, Cumulative Arguments
for Religious Belief, 21 SOPHIA 37 (1982).
90. If we have half a dozen distinct reasons for some rule or policy, the boundary lines
between pursuing and no longer pursuing the likely ill-defined policy will often be difficult to
[Vol. 64
ELECTORAL LIESAND THE BROADER PROBLEMS OFSTRICTSCRUTINY
Worse, how is a narrow tailoring inquiry to accommodate the plain
fact that our most thoughtful actions and policies do not seek to
maximize any single objective? Our actions do not seek to achieve some
single goal, with no concern for other goals, or for costs and conflicts.
Instead, they roughly accommodate several of our partly conflicting and
partly reinforcing priorities, to one degree or another. 91 There is a
difference between a carelessly drafted rule that is thoughtlessly
overinclusive and underinclusive and a rule that is in some sense
overinclusive or underinclusive or both, only because this is an
unavoidable price to pay for accommodating our partly conflicting
interests. We do not, for example, usually pack a lunch to maximize
nutrition, or taste, or convenience, or social impressiveness, or speed, or
cost-effectiveness; neither, by analogy, does the most reasonable
legislature in adopting a statute, especially in the supportive context of
any enacted legislation. But the complications that strict scrutiny
analysis must confront are really only beginning.
III. STRICT SCRUTINY AND THE UNMANAGEABLE COMPLICATIONS OF
THE REAL WORLD
It often makes sense for courts, given their unavoidable limitations,
to defer to the judgment of a legislature. This is especially true on
questions of the possible costs and the degree of effectiveness of
legislation or the realistic feasibility of alternative ways of approaching
the same or somewhat similar legislative goals. 92 What may seem
feasible to a court may be politically or technically unrealistic. What
counts as a similar goal, or as similar outcome, may be politically
controversial. Even apart from separation of powers issues and
institutional comparative advantage concerns, humility remains a
virtue.93
detect.
91. How, in particular, is a court to assess tailoring to a presumed state "interest," when
the state-like most people-pursues some vague, unarticulated combination of partly
conflicting and partly overlapping, if not reinforcing, goals? We could say that only a saint or a
fanatic even approaches seeking to maximize, over the course of a day, some particular value, or
even the unarticulated weighted sum of several values. For a close theoretical approach, see
SOREN KIERKEGAARD, PURITY OF HEART IS TO WILL ONE THING (Douglas V. Steere trans., 1938)
(Harper ed. 1956) (1846).
92. At a minimum, courts often write that it is not within their province to second-guess
congressional wisdom. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003); see also Wyeth
v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009); Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1492, 1494 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998); TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
93. See, e.g., BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, ON THE STEPS OF HUMILITY AND PRIDE, in
SELECTED WORKS 99, 103 (Gillian R. Evans trans., 1987) (1124) ("The fruit of knowledge of
truth is humility."); CAJETAN MARY DA BERGAMO, HUMILITY OF HEART 38 (Herbert Cardinal
Vaughan trans., 1903) (2006 ed.) ("[H]umility. . . is founded on truth and justice"). Notice also
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But once courts try to apply some vision of strict scrutiny, the
important complications quickly multiply beyond anyone's
comprehension. Consider the assumption that the speech regulation in
question is intended to cause one or more desired effects. Now, the very
idea of causation in this sense may seem clear enough, and for present
purposes, we may treat the idea of causation as clear. But we should at
least note for the record that at some level, the very idea of causation
remains contested, if not mysterious.94
Let us nevertheless set aside any such deep uncertainties and
consider the more practical problems of the causal complexities
involved in strict scrutiny analysis. One form of causal complexity with
which strict scrutiny must work has been referred to as "causal
density."95 Consider an example of the important problem of causal
density. We can object to the tone and content of many electoral
campaigns, 96  and sometimes to their demagoguery, pandering,
that a regulated party may have an incentive to falsely claim that some alternative is less
burdensome on its own free speech rights, or on those of other parties not before the court, when
the alternative's only real advantage is that it is far less costly, in financial terms, on the
regulated party.
94. Interestingly, some approaches to the very idea of causation already build in an
emphasis on policymaking and other intentional choices and interventions. See, e.g., JAMES
WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY OF CAUSAL INTERVENTION 12 (2003) ("[A]
very central part of the commonsense notion of cause is precisely that causes are potential
handles or devices for bringing about effects."). Causation in senses relevant to a strict scrutiny
test may rise no higher than statistical probabilities. See Adrian Heathcote & D.M. Armstrong,
Causes and Laws, 25 NOs 63, 63 (1991) ("[T]he fundamental laws that govern causal
processes may be no more than probabilistic."). And we may understand and control much
about a situation while still not understanding the causal relations that actually obtain in the
situation. See Michael Tooley, Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism, 50 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 215, 225 (Supp. 1990). For further discussions illustrating the variety
of contemporary understandings of the idea of causation, see, for example, David Lewis,
Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556 (1973); J. L. Mackie, Causes and Conditions, 2 AM. PHIL. Q. 245
(1965); Jonathan Schaffer, The Metaphysics of Causation, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics (last updated Aug. 13,
2007). For an emphasis on questions of causation in the social sciences, see CAUSAL
EXPLANATION FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (Andrew P. Vayda & Bradley B. Waiters eds., 2011);
Henry E. Brady, Causation and Explanation in Social Science, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL METHODOLOGY ch. 10, at 217 (Janet M. Box-Steffens Meier et al. eds., 2008),
available at http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/oso/private/content/ohopolitics. For a useful
and concise introduction to the idea of causation as variously used in the law, with helpful links
and citations, see Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 020: Causation, LEGAL THEORY
LEXICON, http://lsolun typepadcom/legaltheorylexiconi2004/01/legaltheoryjle.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2012).
95. See Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does-and Doesn't-Know, CITY J.,
http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_3_social-science.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (noting
the variability of "the number and complexity of potential causes of the outcome of interest" and
"causal density").
96. See generally STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How
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emptiness, and infantilism. But these unavoidable electoral phenomena
do not have simple, clear, obvious, empirically provable, unique,
legislatively addressable causes. And this causal multiplicity,
complexity, and uncertainty is typical. Generally, in matters of social
causation, "Jo]ur scientific ignorance of the human condition remains
profound."9 We should expect campaign abuses, like most problems
addressed by legal regulation, to have more than one important if
difficult-to-establish cause.98
Any cause may also have multiple effects.99 Some effects may be
favorable, others not. Some effects, often the most favorable, may
appear immediately, with the possibly disastrous and unprecedented
costs arriving only over time, when it may be realistically too late to
change course.
And not all causes operate in similar ways. 100 One or more causes
may have self-cancelling or mutually cancelling effects. 1 1 It is also
possible that two or more causes may interact and have not merely an
additive, but a multiplicative, effect.'0 2 The number and variety of the
causal complications with which legislators, and judges applying strict
scrutiny, are confronted is daunting. 10 3 What one social scientist has
said holds distinctly true for legislators and judges: "We do not know
how to study [culture] in a way that produces hard numbers and testable
theories. Culture is the realm of novelists and biographers, not of data-
driven social scientists ' '" 10 4
Judges trying to apply strict scrutiny thus can expect only limited
help from social scientists. Directly applicable and thoroughly rigorous
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1997) (discussing the
impact and consequences of negative political advertisements).
97. Manzi, supra note 95.
98. See Paul Humphreys, Causation in the Social Sciences: An Overview, 68 SYNTHESE 1,
1 (1986) (presuming multiple causal influences and multiple effects of each causal factor);
Maarten Chrispeels, Rising Food Prices. Multiple Causes but No Easy Solutions, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., May 9, 2008, at B7 (citing at least four concurrent causes).
99. See supra note 98. See generally Nancy Cartwright, Causation: One Word; Many
Things, CTR. FOR PHIL. NAT. & SOC. SCI. (2002), http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/pdf/DP_
withCoverCausality/CTR07-03-C.pdf (arguing that there exists a great variety of kinds of
causes and that causes of the same kind can operate in different ways).
100. See Cartwright, supra note 99, at 3, 12.
101. See id. at 4.
102. We will consider a medical example. Such a multiplicative effect on the risk of dying
from heart disease may result from the combination of Type 2 diabetes and depression, with the
relevant causal mechanisms not yet being understood. See An Pan et al., Increased Mortality
Risk in Women with Depression and Diabetes Mellitus, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 42, 42
(2011).
103. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
104. James Q. Wilson, Hard Times, Fewer Crimes, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2011, at C1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023040665045763 4 5 5 5 3 135009870.
html.
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empirical studies are, for any given judicial case, unlikely to exist. This
will be as true in the free speech arena as elsewhere. And for a variety
of reasons, any available studies, particularly on controversial, hot-
button, or high-stakes issues, are likely to be inconclusive, misleading,
questionable, or mistaken. 105 Whether a court chooses to excuse or
discount such inevitable deficiencies is largely a matter of the court's
preferences. 106
Courts attempting to apply strict scrutiny responsibly in any context
thus cannot typically rely on directly relevant and well-executed social
science studies. 107 But applying strict scrutiny in the electoral speech or
any other context should, ideally, be a defensible judicial process,
addressing relevant considerations and somehow reaching defensible
results. Courts must somehow make an inescapably comparative
judgment as to whether one or more interests, alone or in combination,
could be called compelling, in light of their various more or less likely
eventual costs and alternatives. Some judicial conclusions must
somehow be reached as to the degree to which one or more interests or
some similar interests will likely be advanced in practice, l10 again giventhe predicted costs. 109  Some errors, such as the partisan
105. See John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLoS
MED. 0696,0699 (2005). For commentary, see, for example, David H. Freedman, Lies, Damned
Lies, and Medical Science, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2010, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/mag
azine/archive/2010/11/lies-damned-lies-and-medicalscience/8269/ (ultimately emphasizing the
role of well-informed professional "instinct" or intuition, with diminished expectations); Robert
Lee Hotz, Most Science Studies Appear to Be Tainted by Sloppy Analysis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,
2007, at B 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 118972683557627104.html; Scientific
Journals: Publish and Be Wrong, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/ node/12376658; see also Jonathan A.C. Sterne & George Davey
Smith, Sifting the Evidence-What's Wrong with Significance Tests?, 81 PHYSICAL THERAPY
1464 (2001).
106. See supra notes 94-104.
107. But consider the Court majority's criticisms of Professor David Baldus' death penalty
studies in the instructive case of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-97 (1987). In contrast,
note the Court's generosity in accepting empirical evidence of quite limited rigor in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1986). Renton, it should be noted,
however, applied intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. See id. at 50.
108. Most purportedly compelling government interests are what might be called practical,
as opposed to symbolic or expressive, interests. Thus, in the lying electoral speech context, the
practical interests sought to be promoted by the regulation may focus on pragmatic goals such
as: reducing lying; promoting more meaningful campaigns; enhancing civic morale and
participation; reducing the public's information-screening costs; penalizing irresponsible
candidates; promoting regime authority and legitimacy; promoting public policy discussion and
consensus-building; and so on. But it is also possible for a government to have an interest in
sending a symbolic or expressive official message against electoral lying, even through criminal
legislation, and even if it is conceded that the legislation will not, in practice, reduce the number
of electoral lies. Such a purely expressive purpose, however, may not be judged to be genuinely
compelling.
109. The constitutional value of partial progress toward a goal varies according to the
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misidentification of lies, or on issues of state of mind, or on a
statement's substantial 110 truth, may be assigned great weight.
Courts must somehow reach some conclusions in this regard in
order to implement the first, or compelling government interest, prong
of strict scrutiny. But the need to compare likely gains and losses under
alternative policies itself again carries the court into the second, or
sufficiently narrow tailoring, prong of strict scrutiny.Il' The two prongs
are again actually inseparable, and they require at least some degree of
empirical insight, predictive capacity, and normative judgment, at both
the fact-specific and at the broader principle or policy levels.12
A further basic problem with which judges applying strict scrutiny
must somehow cope is that, in the words of two leading social
scientists, "[i]n innumerable cases what is in principle predictable is,
today, in fact unpredictable."' '113 The possibility that events relevant to
compellingness of interests, narrowness of tailoring, causation, and the
practical feasibility of alternative regulations" 4 might in principle be
predictable does little practical good. If the court cannot say whether
some alternative regulation is nearly as effective as the rule being
scrutinized,1 5 while also less significantly burdensome on speech rights
overall," 6 much of the logic of strict scrutiny disappears. Why should
nature of the underlying problems, priorities, obstacles, and circumstances. Reducing the
number of instances of campaign lying by, say, 30% may count as a meaningful improvement,
but perhaps not of constitutionally compelling status. By contrast, removing all the electronic
bugs in a room but one, or removing all the hidden explosives in a room but one, may not count
even as a significant gain, let alone one of compelling value.
110. As a matter of common sense, if a reviewing court considers itself competent to pass
judgment on the degrees of truth and falsity of the underlying alleged lie, the court may also
wish to judge some technically false claims to be substantially true, which again requires that
the court assess the importance or triviality of the ways in which the alleged lie can be said to be
false. Several of the allegedly defamatory claims of fact in the classic Sullivan libel case were
held to be technically, but inconsequentially, mistaken, even in combination. See N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 258-59, 264-65 (1964).
111. For a discussion of this relationship, see R. George Wright, Dreams and Formulas:
The Roles of Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 195 (2008).
112. Id.
113. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE 82
(Transaction Publishers 1992) (1953).
114. For typical inconclusive, speculative, factually unconstrained skirmishing over the
likely effectiveness and feasibility of arguably less speech-burdensome regulations, see the
prevailing and dissenting opinions in, for example, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653,
2669-71 (2011), and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996). There is
often little to prevent a reviewing court from simply asserting the feasibility and effectiveness,
to some sufficient degree, of one or more hypothetical alternative regulations, with that
alternative regulation also being casually assumed to really be "narrower," or less burdensome,
all things considered, on the speech rights of all those potentially affected.
115. See 44Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 507.
116. See id.
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the unconstrained guesses of courts on largely empirical matters beyond
anyone's grasp prevail over contrary guesses by legislatures?" 17
Judges trying to work through strict scrutiny tests can certainly draw
upon the testimony, the briefs, and their own life experiences. The most
basic underlying problem, however, is that the limited relevant
information rarely exists in any conveniently "concentrated or
integrated form, but as dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
conflicting knowledge which all the separate individuals possess."'' r8
Does any single judge, for example, know what percentage of electoral
speech generally should count as a lie, or how frequently electoral lies
are believed?
Courts attempting to apply strict scrutiny in a responsible way thus
face a daunting task. Compounding the problem even further is that the
policy options they consider do not come with all of their important
consequences-short- and long-term, direct and indirect-inscribed on
their faces. 19 Consider the various possible effects, over time, of trying
to legislatively or administratively suppress an idea, including the
resulting instances of cowardice, ignorance, resentment, and
martyrdom.
Judges applying strict scrutiny must also be especially aware that
the most important consequences of any policy may be denied or
unforeseen. These unforeseen policy consequences may be favorable,
unfavorable, or both. But the aggressive, multifaceted judicial review
called for by strict scrutiny should humbly recognize that the enacting
117. Even if we assume that courts are more evenhanded and less biased than legislators
and administrators in free speech cases, it is unclear why courts would systematically better
understand how various parties might be affected by various kinds of regulations, or which
regulations are likely feasible and likely more or less effective.
118. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519, 519 (1945).
Professor Friedrich A. Hayek is here making a stronger, less qualified claim. See id.; see also
THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 40 (1980) (describing courts as generally less
inclined than economic or more political institutions to engage in "close weighing of
incremental costs and incremental benefits"). Contrary to Professor Thomas Sowell, however,
we could say that, ideally, the narrow tailoring inquiry is an attempt to assess the incremental
costs of alternative policies. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS ch. 1 (2004)
(examining a variety of ways to capture the collective wisdom of groups and concluding that to
do so successfully requires satisfying several conditions: diversity, independence, and
decentralization). For a general discussion of cost-benefit analysis and of incrementalist
decisionmaking strategies, see COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); see also DAVID
BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS A
SOCIAL PROCESS ch. 5, at 81-93 (1963) (describing "disjointed incrementalism" as a margin-
oriented policy analysis strategy imposing fewer information demands on the decisionmaker,
while admittedly excluding some policy options and some consequences from consideration);
DAHL & LINDBLOM, supra note 113; E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(5th ed. 2007).
119. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
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legislature, the reviewing court, or both may fail to anticipate important
consequences-including the spectacular costs, if not the disastrous
failure-of any given policy alternative.
A statute seeking to regulate electoral lies might, for example, deter
a surprising amount of protected speech. 120 This effect might vary over
time. Much of this effect could go unreported and realistically be
unprovable. Important consequences may be publicly "invisible" or
abstract. Often, courts do not demand much rigorous, compelling causal
evidence of a chilling effect on speech-and rightly not. 12 Or a perhaps
surprisingly minimal amount of protected speech might be deterred or
changed in phrasing. An alternative statute might change these amounts
in surprising ways. It might even be that a broader, less narrowly
tailored regulation may actually deter less protected speech, if that less
narrowly tailored rule is clearer and easier for everyone to apply in
many cases.
The problems of unanticipated policy consequences, especially over
time, must not be minimized in their frequency and gravity. The basic
idea of the importance of unanticipated consequences has been widely
discussed, by writers including Bernard Mandeville, 122 Adam Smith l1 3
G.W.F. Hegel, Frederic Bastiat,12 5 John Dewey,'2 6 Robert Merton,17
120. See, e.g., State v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 694-96 (Wash. 1998) (en
banc).
121. See, e.g., id.
122. See, e.g., BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES 67 (Phillip Harth ed., 1970)
(1724) ("Thus every Part was full of Vice, / Yet the whole Mass a Paradice.").
123. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 129-30 (Laurence Dickey abridged ed. 1993) (1776) ("[H]e intends only his own gain,
and he is ... led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention .... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectively than when he really intends to promote it.").
124. See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
WORLD HISTORY 89 (Hugh Barr Nisbet trans., 1981) (1830).
125. See, e.g., FREDERIC BASTIAT, THAT WHICH IS SEEN, AND THAT WHICH Is NOT SEEN
(trans. unidentified) (1850), available at http://bastiat.org/en/twisatwins.html.
126. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 229 (Dover ed. 2002) (1922)
("It is willful folly to fasten upon some single end or consequence which is liked, and pernit the
view of that to blot from perception all other undesired and undesirable consequences.... Yet
this assumption is continually made."). Dewey may have in mind here not only unintended and
unforeseen consequences, but foreseen consequences that are in some way discounted,
irrationally minimized, or dismissed from consideration. Both of these categories recur
throughout the strict scrutiny cases. Guesses must be made, for example, about the likely
financial costs of alternative policies ten or twenty years into the future. Often, those policy
guesses reflect preferences as much as historical experience.
127. See, e.g., Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social
Action, I AM. SOC. REV. 894, 899 (1936) (recognizing what would today be called "path
dependence," in which slight initial differences or changes in circumstances may be amplified
into dramatically different outcomes over time, creating further difficulties for an aggressive
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and Daniel Bell. 128 Ambitious, speculative forms of judicial review,
including strict scrutiny, are of course especially vulnerable to
unanticipated consequences of various sorts.
As several writers have recognized, contemporary official
decisionmaking has not escaped the problems of unanticipated
consequences. Thus in the realm of public and private decisionmaking
generally, there are, for example: reports of law schools gaming the
ranking systems in unanticipated ways; golf carts qualifying for electric
vehicle tax credits; archeological objects being broken into parts for
greater collector payments; production runs of all left shoes to meet a
centralized shoe production quota; leaving old and intensely polluting
sources unmodified in order to avoid expensive regulations; energy-
efficient refrigerator subsidies increasing the use of second, "beer
refrigerators"; disastrous introduction of non-native plant and animal
species; emphases on public school math and English test scores as
reducing attention to other important subjects; libel and privacy law as
reducing the number and usefulness of recommendation letters; the ban
on DDT as adversely affecting the incidence of malaria; conscious
efforts to raise student self-esteem as adversely affecting other traits;
and mortgage-lending eligibility rules having unanticipated adverse
consequences. 130
Unanticipated consequences, favorable and unfavorable, inevitably
arise to one degree or another as a result of any kind of decisionmaking
process. But courts that undertake the especially ambitious,
nondeferentia 13' task of strict scrutiny review, including requiring
narrow tailoring analysis). For background on path dependence, see, for example, Stephen E.
Margolis & S.J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 17-22 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
128. See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM ch. 1,
afterword (20th anniversary ed. 1996) (1976); see also MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC
AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (1905).
129. See, e.g., Richard Vernon, Unintended Consequences, 7 POL. THEORY 57, 60 (1979)
(noting distinctive "threshold" and "trigger" effects). More broadly, see JOHN MANSFIELD, THE
NATURE OF CHANGE OR THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT TO
DESIGNING COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND MANAGING CHANGE 181-82 (2010). For an often
entertaining online collection, see Museum of Unintended Consequences, CAL. STATE UNIV.,
L.A., DEP'T COMPUTER SCI. WIKI, http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/index.php/Courses/CS_46 1/Muse
umof unintended consequences (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (cataloging unintended
consequences in various contexts); see also The Law of Unintended Consequences, GLOBE-
NET, www.globe-net.com/articles/2010/june/17/the-law-of-unintended-consequences (last
visited Feb. 17, 2012) (listing several instances of disastrous unintended consequences). On
perverse incentives specifically, see Sean Masaki Flynn, Perverse Incentives, FORBES, Feb. 19,
2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/19/incentives-compensation-bonuses-leadership_ perver
ted incentives.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). More broadly, see C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON,
PARKINSON: THE LAW (1 st American ed. 1980) (1957).
130. See supra notes 124-25.
131. Several cases have discussed the placement of the burden of proof on the government
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sufficiently compelling causal proof, are subjected to cognitive demands
and burdens of an extraordinary sort. The costs of mistakes in applying
strict scrutiny, however, typically appear only gradually, over time, and
may not only be widely dispersed, but nearly invisible to most citizens,
and they may be untraced to the particular reviewing court, which in
any event need not accept any real responsibility for unanticipated costs.
The costs of applying strict scrutiny may even be blamed on the text of
the Constitution or on the drafters of a statute.
For generalist judges applying strict scrutiny, many actually likely
results will seem unlikely or counterintuitive.132 This will be especially
true whenever statistics and probability' 33 or science and technology are
involved. 134 Reality often defies common sense-trained or untrained.
Guesses at comparative probabilities are often unavoidably near the
heart of strict scrutiny analysis in any legal context.
Similarly, strict scrutiny even allows scope for judges to dismiss,
ignore, diminish, or reframe reasonably foreseeable, or even intended,
policy consequences' 35 that many affected persons would think of as
significant costs. This may happen consciously or subconsciously' 36 in
any given strict scrutiny case. Too many strict scrutiny cases are
presented by their judges as much easier than they are. This general
under strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738-42 (2011)
(requiring rigorous causal proof); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898
(2010); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464-65 (2007);
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (defining strict scrutiny review of racial
classifications, as distinct from electoral speech or other free speech cases); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
132. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
133. Consider, for example, the natural inclination to believe that a positive result of a
well-credentialed medical test means that the patient probably has the disease, even where the
baseline incidence of the disease in question is quite low. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky, Heuristics,
Biases, and Governance, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING ch. 28
(Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004); see also id. at 570 ("Judges and juries seem to
lack the cognitive abilities necessary to make proper statistical inferences."). Unfortunately,
statistics and probability judgments of various complex sorts pervade strict scrutiny. For a
general collection of counterintuitive mathematical results, see JULIAN HAVIL, IMPOSSIBLE:
SURPRISING SOLUTIONS TO COUNTERINTUITIVE CONUNDRUMS (2008).
134. For an admittedly extreme case, see the real-world application of quantum
phenomena. See JOHN POLKINGHORNE, QUANTUM THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 24
(2002) ("The superposition principle implies.., that it is no longer possible to form a clear
picture of what is happening in the course of physical processes."); see also PHILOSOPHICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF QUANTUM THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON BELL'S THEOREM (James T. Cushing &
Eman McMullin eds., 1989).
135. See Patricia Cohen, Reason Seen More as Weapon than Path to Truth, N.Y. TIMES,




phenomenon is certainly not new,' 37 but strict scrutiny analysis
particularly in a politically polarized and largely adversarial culture,13 8
is especially vulnerable to such failings.
More generally, despite the insulation, in certain respects, of federal
judges, the more ambitious the form of judicial review, the more likely
the court is to fall victim to one form or another of cognitive bias.
Judges, no less than politicians or economic advisors, are capable of
coping mechanisms, such as denial.139 Some very real possibilities may
be considered too disturbing and are therefore treated as unreal or
unlikely and unworthy of sustained conscious reflection. 140 As one
scholar describes the general phenomenon, "Negative information tends
to be regarded as less valid, less accurate, and explainable by external
factors. ' 41
The number of the identified cognitive and related biases142 to
which judges applying ambitious strict scrutiny may be susceptible
continues to grow. 143 Illustrative of such general bias are the tendency
to begin our decisionmaking from arbitrary anchoring points 144 and then
to make insufficient adjustments, 145 to over- and underemphasize
particular items of information; 146 to calculate gains and losses against
some aspiration rather than the status quo;14  to overemphasize the
137. See, e.g., Frank H. Knight, Social Causation, 49 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 46, 52 (1943)
("There seems to be some innate repugnance in human nature against ... rationally facing the
problem of choice as a comparison of possible alternatives. Human nature seems to be
fundamentally romantic in this regard; men in general hate any reference to 'costs,' which
means simply the deliberate comparison of alternatives."). This is compatible with the more
basic point, with which strict scrutiny is uncomfortable, that "[i]t is not usually possible to
predict the actual magnitude of a dependent variable at any moment, as a function of time,
because the necessary data are not available." Id. at 51-52.
138. See Cohen, supra note 135; Wright, supra note 68, at 129.
139. See, e.g., RICHARD S. TEDLOw, DENIAL: WHY BUSINESS LEADERS FAIL TO LOOK FACTS
IN THE FACE-AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 33 (2010) ("Sometimes we divert information from
awareness because it is too painful or stressful.... More commonly, we do so because the
offending information contradicts assumptions with which we are comfortable, and it is easier to
reject the information than to change our assumptions."); see also STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF
DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 1 (2011).
140. See TEDLOW, supra note 139, at 30-33.
141. DAVID HARDMAN, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
44 (2009).
142. For rigorous background, see HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
143. For a fascinating series of (extremely) brief entries, see List of Cognitive Biases,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of cognitive biases (last visited May 31, 2011).
144. See HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 142, at chs. 6-8; HARDMAN, supra note 141,
at 32.
145. See HARDMAN, supra note 141, at 32.
146. See id. at 63.
147. See id. at 76.
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concrete, the visible, the personalized, and the short-term; 148 to be
overconfident in our own judgments 14 9 particularly when we perceive
ourselves to have some control;'? and to focus excessively on
intentions and on intentions as driving actual results and long-term
outcomes. 151 Perhaps most ominously of all, there is evidence that
persons in the general position of judges "tend to overweight their own
opinion relative to that of an adviser and to only shift a token amount
toward the adviser's recommendation."' 152 This may not bode well if
judges in strict scrutiny cases regard the attorneys and witnesses in a
case, including expert witnesses, as "advisers."
If we add to all of this the imlortant role of emotion in deciding
questions involving free speech, 53 alleged lying, elections, and
sometimes intense partisanship, we must doubt that judicial strict
scrutiny in fractice resembles strict scrutiny as it is depicted in the case
reporters.'15Professor David Hardman concludes much more generally
that "[a] considerable body of evidence indicates that people have little,
if any, insight into the process underlying their judgments and
decisions.... [P]eople's reports on their own behavior are essentially
rationalizations."' 155
It may be that judges sometimes try to minimize all of the various
complications noted above in this Article. But it is realistically asking
too much of judges to follow and to be genuinely guided by the
demanding requirements of strict scrutiny in cases of alleged electoral
lying. Is the application of strict scrutiny, as specified in the cases,
ultimately unattainable, and a way of rationalizing judicial outcomes
reached on other grounds?
148. See id. at 90.
149. See id at 94; see also PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS
IT? How CAN WE KNow? ch. 3 (2006).
150. See supra note 129.
151. See HARDMAN, supra note 141, at 115; see also notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
152. HARDMAN, supra note 141, at 156.
153. See id. at 185 ("It is now clear that emotions play a prominent role in decision
making"); R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 34 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 429, 455-59 (2003).
154. See HARDMAN, supra note 141, at 185-86; see also Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy
DeCamp Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84
PSYCHOL. REv. 231 (1977).
155. See HARDMAN, supra note 141, at 186 (citing Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 154). For
further discussion of the role of emotion and of subconscious processes in moral judgments, see,
for example, Joshua D. Greene et al., AnfMRJ Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001), and Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational
Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001).
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CONCLUSION: CAN THE STANDARD PRACTICE OF STRICT SCRUTINY
REALISTICALLY BE IMPROVED?
At this point, strict scrutiny, with its two familiar components along
with causation, is probably too well-entrenched and too manipulable to
be abandoned. But it is also fair to imagine that legal cultures can
change over time to some degree, even if the legal tests and terminology
formally remain the same.
One extreme approach would be to set aside the idea of a strict
scrutiny test as substantively dictating the outcomes of cases. Under this
revised view, we would instead interpret strict scrutiny in terms of mere
procedural requirements rather than substantive requirements. Courts
could ask the relevant legislature, in a properly litigated case, to talk"after the fact" in terms of possible compelling governmental interests,
alternative policies, burdens, costs, and narrow tailoring. The legislature
or agency's response to a court hearing the constitutional challenge
need not be confined to legislative history but could be brief, depending
on the scope and stakes involved in the given case. Courts would then
typically review this response merely for evidence of meaningful
legislative reflection, in roughly the same way an agency is required to
prepare an adequate Environmental Impact Statement 156 under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 157 There is, by analogy, no
substantive requirement that the agency involved actually rank
environmental effects among its highest agency priorities. 158 No
genuinely convincing cost estimates or causal scenarios need be
provided. The goal of NEPA in this regard is instead to procedurally
improve agency decisionmaking. Roughly, an affected agency must
publicly articulate evidence that it has conscientiously thought about
alternative policies and a number of the potential environmental costs
and other effects of the proposed agency action.1 59 This is essentially a
matter of procedural compliance by the agency. Acute foresight,
substantive convincingness, and practical wisdom are not required.
By loose analogy, one might choose to think of a procedural strict
scrutiny analysis as requiring the court itself and then the underlying
government regulators, given the court's guidance, to reflect
conscientiously on some of the significant interests, likely results, and
possible costs of the proposed and alternative policies potentially
available. The court would then review the legislators' response merely
156. See the crucial statutory provision at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2010).
157. See id. as initially adopted in 1970.
158. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349-52
(1989); J.B. RuHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JAMES SALZMAN, THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 433-34 (2008).
159. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349-52; RUNL, NAGLE & SALZMAN, supra note 158, at
433-34.
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for conscientious procedural compliance, roughly as in the NEPA cases.
This procedural strict scrutiny would thus typically amount to a
requirement that the challenged legislature perform, in the present, an
examination of the legislation or a regulation thereunder, in general or
as applied in the particular case circumstances.
Under procedural strict scrutiny, the reviewing court would not
generally strike down legislation or a government act on substantive
constitutional grounds by applying strict scrutiny, except in rare
circumstances. Crucially, though, if a court were so inclined it could
still at any point decide any case on the constitutional merits, but by
means of some relevant specialized free speech test or on the basis of
some general constitutional test other than strict scrutiny. Patently
unfair and unequal or hostility-based legislation can be struck down
without recourse to strict scrutiny.
Of course, lower levels of judicial scrutiny are subject to abuse, as
well, but such tests generally are not as unrealistically ambitious or as
variously and unrealistically demanding on the abilities of courts.
It is also possible that the current legislature may actually be
unsympathetic to the challenged legislation. But if the current
legislature's own assessment of the legislation is largely unsympathetic,
the legislature's publicly and clearly declaring so could be treated by a
reviewing court as an amendment, limitation, or even repeal of the
initial legislation. The current legislature could then or later choose to
rewrite the legislation in question, subject to further possible judicial
review.
A looser, more proceduralist interpretation of strict scrutiny might
either reduce or increase predictability in the law. This effect would be
unclear in advance. But we must also remember the various forms of
speculation and manipulability of strict scrutiny as it is currently
practiced.1 60 In particular, we should remember the opposing directions
strict scrutiny has taken us in the specific context of deliberate lying in
electoral contexts.1 61
Another separate approach to the problems of strict scrutiny might
be to simply abandon the formal two-part strict scrutiny test, based on
the unrealism of and various weaknesses in the test.162 In some strict
scrutiny cases, a single consideration or group of considerations may
intuitively strike us as really decisive. The full grounds of even our best
intuitions cannot be explicitly articulated. In such a case, pretending that
our intuitive result is meaningfully validated by-let alone really
derived from-following the unrealistic and over-ambitious two-part
160. See supra Parts II, III.
161. See supra Part I for the varying outcomes even among the cases explicitly applying
strict scrutiny.
162. See supra Parts II, III.
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strict scrutiny test is artificial and misleading at best. Honesty and
legitimacy require that the courts, along with the rest of us, concede the
importance of what we might call trained or habituated, and ideally,
well-disciplined intuition.
Some judges evidently have the present intuition that a deliberate
electoral lie in practice undermines free speech and electoral politics
more than it promotes them. 163 Other judges, on their own equally
careful consideration, may somehow intuit that the risks of error,
partisanship, and abuse inherent in allowing legislatures, agencies,
prosecutors, and courts to adjudicate cases of electoral lying far exceed
any likely benefits to free speech, untainted elections, and
democracy.1 64
Thus, judicial intuitions may in the most difficult and most
speculative cases sometimes conflict, even with experience over long
periods of time. But judicially relying on intuition, derived from a
careful and conscientious study of both precedent and any other
graspable and apparently relevant consideration, is often justifiable, 165 if
not always inevitable.'16 Judicial intuitions need not and should not be
stated in a bald and unreasoning way, or casually arrived at; there is
usually much that can be said in a judicial opinion in support of a
sensible judicial intuition.' 67
A court that is not bound by the unrealistic pretenses of the strict
scrutiny formula would usefully illustrate that most interesting free
speech and equal protection cases cannot reliably be decided by formula
or mechanically. Legislative reflections and judicial intuitions may
reflect ultimately different degrees of practical wisdom,' 68 judicial self-
restraint, and reason-grounded humility 169 in the face of unavoidable
complexity. In fact, it is ultimately possible that the presence or absence
of these virtues may be even more important than the continued use or
replacement, in electoral speech cases or elsewhere, 170 of typical forms
163. See, e.g., supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
165. See generally R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42
Hous. L. REV. 1381, 1382-85, 1420-24 (2006) (describing the decisionmaking process through
which judges often go in reaching their final judgments).
166. See id
167. See id. Others have discussed a sophisticated version of contemporary moral
intuitionism. See MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL INTUITIONISM (2008); see also ROBERT AUDI,
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER (1997); ETHICAL INTUITIONISM: RE-
EVALUATIONS (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2003).
168. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Whose Phronesis? Which Phronimoi?: A Response to
Dean Kronman on Law School Education, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 817 (1996) (exploring the concept
of practical wisdom).
169. See supra note 93.
170. Note that the Supreme Court unanimously appreciated the stigmatizing and material
inequalities of the public school systems at issue in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
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of judicial strict scrutiny.
(1954), without artificial recourse to a formal strict scrutiny test.

